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or over a decade, the widespread use of explosive
weapons by all sides in the Syrian conflict has been
well documented by a litany of public sources. Many
of these explosive munitions fail to detonate as intended,
thereby becoming unexploded ordnance (UXO) that
threaten post-conflict recovery. To begin the process of
clearing these explosive remnants of war (ERW), desk
studies/non-technical studies can be utilized to initially assess the concentration and distribution of
explosive weapons across a conflict zone, which in
turn suggest the risk of UXO in an area. Traditional
methods in non-technical surveys (NTS) focus on
unweighted conflict intensity scores (counting
the number of events) or after-the-fact munition
detonations to determine current contamination.1
The authors propose a novel, nuanced approach
to counting the number of munitions per event,
not just the number of events. This new opensource weighted estimate (OSWE) method contains higher-fidelity data for analysis with more
specific coverage across a larger geographic area
than prior models. Using crucial and corroborated
open-source investigation workflows, the authors
created a nationwide assessment paradigm. In
comparison with older models, we anticipate that
the OSWE method of estimating UXO concentration is more useful across a greater range of geographic scopes through its leverage of big data,
weighted nature, and data selection for events
likely to generate UXO. The OSWE method also
produces an estimate for UXO in Syria (a minimum
of 100,000 nationwide). These are important findings, as more accurate estimates can be replicated across contexts, including in Ukraine.
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Destroyed buildings in Homs, Syria.
Photo courtesy of Adobe Stockphotos.

Introduction
Although media attention has waned, the Syrian conflict continues, albeit on a smaller scale.2 A nationwide cease-fire announced
in March 2020 has largely held, leading to minimal exchange of
territory among the major warring factions. Despite relatively constant areas of control, the use of explosive weapons and the detonation of UXO is a weekly occurrence. These detonations happen
across the country regardless of which faction controls territories
and often at the cost of civilian life and limb.
In Syria, clearance of explosive contaminants is disrupted by a
slew of variables, namely instabilities in project funding, a volatile
security environment, a prohibitive sanctions regime, uncooperative local partners, and security access challenges of remote contamination assessment. Despite these complicating variables, this
paper will specifically focus on the initial stages of the explosive
ordnance (EO) clearance process by using open-source data on the
conflict in Syria to enhance an NTS. This approach is intended to
assist in the prioritization of key areas.
In 2011, many Syrian civilians took to the streets, calling for
reform as part of a popular national protest inspired by other
mass mobilizations collectively described as the Arab Uprisings.

An ensuing security crackdown on peaceful protesters prompted
the protest movement to call for the overthrow of the Syrian government led by President Bashar al-Assad.3 Further crackdowns
led to defections from the armed forces of Syria, and armed demonstrators shooting back at military forces sent to quell riots. This
cycle escalated into open conflict, occurring for over a decade with
four major territory-holding factions vying for control. Two dozen
more international armed forces have also engaged in Syria, mostly
through airstrikes and artillery strikes.
Syria has had stable frontlines since the spring of 2020, when a
cease-fire was brokered between the government of Syria and the
Turkish-backed opposition in Syria’s northwest. While no new
major offensive has occurred since then—itself a mark of the ceasefire’s conflict resolution success—the term “cease-fire” is a misnomer, as indirect conflict and occasional clashes are still reported
daily in Syria. Syria’s northwest region, where frontlines between
the opposition and the government meet, averages at least 350
conflict events per month as recorded by the Armed Conflict and
Location Event Database (ACLED).

Literature Review
Since World War II, UXO have traditionally been detected
on the ground by clearance teams who detect potential hazards,
excavate, and determine if the object is a UXO.4 The prevailing
approaches used in humanitarian mine action (HMA) employ
either magnetometers or terrestrial electromagnetic induction
(EMI) systems. 5 Although these have been validated as one of the
most dependable geophysical methods for HMA, they have several weaknesses, including high false-positive rates in areas with
metallic clutter,6 time and labor intensiveness,7 and operator vulnerability.8 These factors, along with operator experience and the
technological capability of mine-detection technology, impact the
rate of mine clearance.9
Newer approaches conduct automated surveying by remote
sensing via magnetometers deployed on unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) to scan wider areas more rapidly and safely.10 This reduces
both financial costs in terms of information-gathering and risks
to personnel and equipment related to accidental detonation during on-site detection.11 Although this is a useful preliminary tool
for reducing the geographical expanse and cost of ground-based
surveys employed in HMA, UAVs are generally limited by weather
and environmental conditions,12 though novel approaches such as
using multi-sensor configurations attempt to overcome this.13 UAV
surveying also requires analyzing large, complex datasets, relying
heavily upon advances in machine learning (ML) to help interpret the data.14 Background noise in the data is another obstacle.15
Recent work using ML to detect and classify ordnance shows promise,16 but it is still in early phases of testing and implementation.

Given these challenges, many HMA organizations have shifted
efforts toward desk-based, data-driven approaches such as NTS.17
Such approaches offer preliminary assessments to detect areas of
interest to prioritize technical on-the-ground surveying.18 The
inherent difficulty in UXO detection and clearance in active conflict zones19 can be augmented using these methods, given the risk
of surveying areas that are traditionally considered too dangerous
for intervention (i.e., along the frontlines).20 Recent efforts demonstrate the value of using open-source investigation (OSINV) for
such preassessments. An innovative approach developed by The
Carter Center in 2019 optimizes existing open-source data on conflict events in Syria (ACLED and The Carter Center data collections)
to produce heat maps for high levels of explosive weapons use and
therefore potential UXO contamination.21 The HALO Trust, one
of the world’s preeminent demining organizations, recently joined
forces with Esri (the organization that develops ArcGIS) to map in
real time the presence of UXO and damage to residential areas or
infrastructure as the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfolds.22 This
includes efforts to automate mapping processes, where experts can
filter through a stream of evidence instead of manually searching
the internet for news articles and social media.23 Although this
offers the potential to document UXO presence in current and
future conflicts, munitions exist from as far back as World War I.24
The utility of The Carter Center’s approach is evident in the potential to make use of decades of existing data, 25 in combination with
current OSINV methods to address ERW.
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Methodology and Models
Carter Center Decoupled Events

ACLED Input Event
”On 21 May 2019…armed clashes…”

Event type

Munitions Type

Aerial Bombardment

Air Launched

Shelling

Ground Launched

Clashes

Excluded

Explosive contaminants are a large set of deadly munitions or
devices that include landmines and improvised explosives devices
(IEDs) as well as ERW. ERW as a classification includes both UXO
and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO); the former fail to detonate as intended and the latter are left behind or forgotten about.
Two core databases of conflict events inform this study. The first
is ACLED, which has coverage dating back to early 2017 for the
whole of Syria. The second is a unique dataset collected by The
Carter Center dating to 2012. Both datasets use a similar sourcing
methodology based on open-source collection and multi-user verification. Key sources for both sets include the Syrian Observatory
for Human Rights (SOHR)—a research network of on-the-ground
journalists and activists led by Rami Abdulrahman, 26 conflict
event information posted by trusted accounts on Twitter, local
newspapers, and video content shared on YouTube or Telegram,
with The Carter Center more often leveraging the latter. These conflict events in both datasets are classified by location, date, event
type, and a qualitative description of the event in plain writing.
The first and primary model we present is the OSWE model. To
create this model, raw data from ACLED and The Carter Center are
amended to be more optimally useful for desk study of UXO concentration.27 ACLED combines multiple explosive events (including multiple event types) in one location on one day into a single
event, labeled as only the event type considered to be the most
extreme. For example, an event that had artillery shelling, aerial
bombardment, and armed clashes would be treated as one event
marked as aerial bombardment. The additional event types are
then described in the qualitative description column. See Figure 1
for a visual explaining this decoupling.
The parsing of events helps to more accurately detect potential
areas and density of UXO contamination. In partnership with
Microsoft, we deploy a natural language processing technique based
on the BERT model28 to efficiently and broadly separate ACLEDreported events into constituent conflict events.29 We then begin by
filtering data from both ACLED and The Carter Center for conflict
events that deploy explosive munitions, namely aerial bombardment, shelling, IEDs, landmines, and reports of other UXO.
After selecting these event types, the question of how to weigh
different event types persists. A key benefit of The Carter Center’s
2012–2017 data is that it contains occasional mention of munition
count estimates from on-the-ground reports30 or in some cases,
explicit counting of munitions from video footage used as sourcing material.31 After cleaning the data further to specify munition
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Figure 1. Visual description of
The Carter Center’s process for
decoupling data from ACLED.

All graphics courtesy of the authors.
Sample Set
Event Count

Sample Set
Average (Estimate)

6,718

7.78 (8)

6,250

9.96 (10)

Landmines/UXO/IED

5,549

1.10 (1)

Miscellaneous Other

214

4.05 (4)

Munitions Category
Air-Launched
Munitions
Ground-Launched
Munitions

Table 1. Open-Source Weighted Estimate Model Sample
Set Detail.
counts across the data in which numbers are included, we then
use each munition category (air-launched, ground-launched, IED/
UXO/landmine, and miscellaneous other ) to create an estimate for
each. The number of events that inform each of these estimates, as
well as the mean of each sample used for each category are included
in Table 1.
Next, for comparison, we create two other models derived from
the same underlying dataset at the same scale. The first of these
models is the conflict intensity model, traditionally the default
approach for United Nations agencies and others alike. 33 This
model takes underlying conflict event data of all types (inclusive
of clashes, sniper fire, etc.), and uses these unweighted values to
assess the intensity of fighting over the course of a war in a geospatially specific manner. The final model, the UXO detonation
model, pulls from conflict event data of recorded UXO detonation, excluding all other events. This is done through qualitative
filtering of events based on the notes/description column of the
data, selecting for events explicitly mentioning unexploded munitions, munitions exploding from previous fighting, and explosives
of unknown origin.
We then run all three models at localized point-of-interest areas
in Syria, which are based on an intentionally and conflict-relevant
amended version of the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UNOCHA) geolocated populated places
data.34 The amendments are minor but incorporate several key
areas such as critical infrastructure or military locations in addition to the civilian points of the UNOCHA dataset. We then geoprocessed latitude and longitude coordinates for territorial control
points using ArcGIS’s Thiessen projection’s function, 35 thereby creating polygons around each unique spatial point to estimate each
location’s geographic area.36 Using a 1:1 spatial join, the results

from each of the three distinct models are added to the Thiessen
shapefile, providing a sum of munitions estimates for the OSWE
model and a count of events for the other models.
The results for each of the three UXO data results for potential
areas of contamination are normalized by the estimated polygon

shape area for each location and then selected for high and low concentration estimates. These estimates are then assessed for comparative analysis of differences between the three models at a local
(i.e., populated places) scale. Findings based on these comparisons
are presented and discussed next.

Data Findings

Figure 2. Nationwide heatmaps of the OSWE model (left), conflict intensity model (center), and UXO detonation
model (right).
Utilizing the OSWE model permits interpolating estimates for
missing data of munitions counts, thus enabling us to extrapolate
closer estimates of likely explosives munitions use across Syria. 37
Notably, this nets an estimate of well over one million explosive
munitions deployed in Syria by mid-2021. At a ten percent munitions detonation failure rate, 38 over 100,000 munitions need clearance nationwide, though this number is likely much higher.
Each model results in different spatial distribution of likely UXO
concentration; they are compared in Figure 2, indicating OSWE,
conflict intensity, and UXO detonation models from left to right.
The OSWE model (left) has much higher concentration in western Syria. The conflict intensity model (center) has a bit more of a
dispersed geospatial concentration. Finally, the UXO detonation
model (right) is heavily skewed toward southern Syria. Viewing
these models at a national scale is not as meaningful as getting into
a location-based specificity, so the authors developed an analytical
framework based on high levels of local concentration of explosive
munitions use, conflict events, and UXO detonations, respectively.
Using these three models to assess local contamination, we
then select for what we refer to as high-UXO-density locations
(HUDLs)—locations that score one standard deviation above
the model’s mean point value. These communities are those in
which each model presents a location of imperative UXO cleaning operations.
The three models identified different numbers of HUDLs based
on levels of variance inherent within the models. The OSWE
method pinpointed the broadest number of HUDLs (126), given
the disproportionate level of explosives munitions use within a
broad swath of key locations. Many of these locations endured
long-term active frontlines or were under heavy siege for many

months. The UXO detonation model determined the lowest number of HUDLs (eighteen), in large part due to the comparatively
low level of data inputs.
While these three models bear some overlap in HUDL selection (see Figure 3), the findings suggest that each approach has a
distinct usefulness or aim, with substantial overlap between the
OSWE method and a contemporary conflict intensity method.
All three models are derived from data with significant correlation (and indeed perhaps some codeterminance if not compared
and analyzed more intimately). The breakdown of locations identified by these models is shown in Table 2 (next page).
Notably, Model A (OSWE) and B (conflict intensity) had the
most overlap with each other, sharing the majority of their identified HUDLs. The conflict intensity model has the most unique locations identified, a factor that we attribute to the broadness of this
model’s approach as we describe earlier in this paper.
Figure 3. Visualization
of shared HUDL
identification by all
three models. Nodes
are for locations
and edges are for
selection in the
associated
model.
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Shared with Model A
(percentage)

Shared with Model B
(percentage)

Shared with Model C
(percentage)

Unique Locations
Idenfied (percentage)

-

112 (75%)

11 (61%)

14 (11%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

112 (89%)

-

15 (83%)

34 (23%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

11 (9%)

15 (10%)

-

3 (17%)

Model
Model A - OSWE

Table 2. UXO estimate model HUDL overlap.

Analysis and Implications
We conclude that the OSWE method has more optimal, precise,
and expansive coverage of potential UXO contamination for current, future, and past conflicts. This is in large part due to the leverage of weighted big data approaches that underlie the desk study
method. This gives our approach considerable leverage for assessing needs and directing resources in any high-level armed conflict
where explosive munitions are and have been used at scale.
It is also crucial to note that this is only the tip of the OSWE
iceberg, as other sources for estimate weights can be applied
across contexts. In the model deployed for this desk survey, we
base estimates around munitions category (air-launched, groundlaunched, etc.), whereas munitions type (mortar, rocket artillery,
barrel bomb, airplane-launched, etc.) will provide a more granulate weighted estimate. Other methods of interpolation, such as
frontline density, era of conflict, or initiating actor could allow for
a compounding weighted estimate that may provide a more rigorous insight in future models.
UXO contamination is an issue that crosses frontlines and political divides, affecting large portions of Syria. Of the communities
at high risk identified through the OSWE method, Table 3 identifies the breakdown of which actors control the most likely HUDLs
in Syria.

Perhaps unsurprising to those watching Syria closely, the government of Syria controls the lion’s share of HUDLs in all models, in no small part due to its control over most of the territory of
Syria. However, this still accounts for a disproportionate share of
explosives munitions use, given that the government holds territorial claim over about fifty-five percent of all point locations tracked
by The Carter Center and about sixty-four percent of the total territory. Part of this high concentration of likely UXO contamination
in government-held territory has to do with the protracted conflict
and heavy besiegement of many territories retaken by the government, especially between 2017 and 2018.
Another crucial component of the OSWE method is that in addition to providing a count and percentage of HUDLs held by each
territory-holding actor in Syria, it allows for an estimated count of
munitions within each actor’s held territory. Table 4 identifies this
breakdown by each of the three major actors.
Using the results from the OSWE model helps assess contamination for areas controlled by different actors in Syria, allowing
HMA organizations with access to only one actor to assess needs
across their accessible territory. Table 3 indicates that the government of Syria controls many HUDLs through all three model
approaches; the OSWE can give useful insights about the density

Count of HUDLs
Government-Held
(percentage)

Count of HUDLs
Opposition-Held
(percentage)

Count of HUDLs SDFHeld (percentage)

Count of HUDLs Joint
Government & SDF-Held
(percentage)

Model A - OSWE

117 (92%)

6 (5%)

2 (2%)

1 (1%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

129 (86%)

9 (6%)

6 (4%)

4 (4%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

10 (56%)

5 (28%)

0 (0%)

3 (16%)

Model

Table 3. HUDL count by faction control.
Count of HUDLs
(percentage)

Total Territory Held in
SQKM (percentage)

Estimated Count of
UXO (percentage)

UXO Density in UXO
per SQKM

Government-Held

117 (92%)

118,869 (64%)

757,689 (79%)

6.4

Opposition-Held

6 (5%)

11,174 (6%)

145,369 (15%)

13.0

SDF-Held

2 (2%)

46,087 (25%)

33,146 (3%)

0.7

1 (<1%)

2,939 (2%)

24,643 (3%)

8.4

0 (0%)

6,759 (3%)

14 (<1%)

0.0

Joint Government & SDF-Held
US-Held

Table 4. OSWE model detection of UXO by faction.
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Model

Count of HUDLs (percentage)

Primary HUDL Holder, by Count Primary Governorate, by Count
(percentage)
(percentage)

Model A - OSWE

100 (79%)

Government, 117 (93%)

Aleppo, 57 (45%)

Model B - Conflict Intensity

92 (61%)

Government, 129 (86%)

Aleppo, 70 (47%)

Model D - UXO Detonation

18 (100%)

Government, 10 (56%)

Aleppo, 5 (28%)

Table 5. Model comparison, filtered by location 2+ degrees from a frontline.
of explosive weapons use and likely UXO contamination that follows. Using this approach, we find that the territory holder with
the highest likely UXO density is the armed opposition, who have
almost twice the likely level of contamination as the government
of Syria on the aggregate. Notably, the opposition only controls
about six percent of all territory by area and about sixteen percent
of all settled locations.
One final example assessing HUDLs and areas of control by
the major factions in Syria’s war has to do with the frontlines
in Syria. A major hurdle identified both in the literature and in
conversations we had with HMA personnel pertains to the aforementioned security risks associated with frontlines. Filtering
these three models for locations that are at least fifteen km from
a frontline allows for selection of both high-density areas for
clearance and those that are more accessible to technical survey and clearance teams. This can be accomplished by using
The Carter Center’s previously discussed geolocated dataset on
territorial control in Syria. The previously described Thiessen
polygons are created by estimated midpoints between neighboring locations. Dissolving these point-centered polygons based

on an aggregated feature, in this case “armed group in control,”
allows for creating larger polygons that denote areas of control
for each month in the conf lict, resulting in a highly accurate and
dynamic estimate of frontline locations. Using the proximity
function, the distance from each location point to the boundary
of neighboring polygons controlled by opposing armed factions
allows for estimating distance from the frontline, or more than
one in cases where multiple fronts are colliding. In turn, it is
possible to assess how geographically concentrated locations are
within conf lict zones.
See Table 5 for information about how each of these three models
interacts with this filter for HUDLs at least fifteen km away from a
frontline.39 As of June 2022, 5,127 locations (points of control) are
at least fifteen km from a frontline (or sixty-three percent of Syria).
Combining such analysis with the OSWE method illustrates
how impactful such a method could be for those directing the difficult work of technical surveys and eventual UXO and mine clearance projects while safeguarding the safety of their staff.

Conclusion
It is crucial to note that this methodology is still in development.
This paper builds upon a few years of data collection and analysis, but The Carter Center is continuing to hone this methodology.
We aim to ensure that the method is easily replicable in other contexts, and indeed a similar approach is now being used by others in
the field today. As noted, HALO is partnering with Esri to utilize
open-source data to anticipate UXO clearance needs in Ukraine as
the war there unfolds. Development of this theoretical desk study
method, as with any method for determining likely UXO density
and clearance need, is directly connected to saving the lives of
civilians who have already endured a brutal conflict.

The Carter Center is expressly interested in working with HMA
organizations to continue developing methods to improve and
make the explosives clearance process more feasible and efficient.
Relatedly, this method could be tested in the future against UXO
clearance data—checking the newer OSWE method against legacy
desk study approaches. With access to that responding data, analysts will be able to run tests measuring direct applicability of this
method to continue to assess biases in the data and its methods.
See endnotes page 111
The views expressed in this article do not represent the authors’
current or previous employers.
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1. As a data abstraction of UXO detonation data as detection
model, some UXO clearing organizations also use models
based on injuries or fatalities rated to UXO detonation events.
This report will not cover this method, but Carter Center staff
did run the model for testing.
2. The Carter Center continues to release quarterly conflict summaries on the war in Syria, which can be read on the Conflict
Resolution Program’s departmental webpage here: https://bit.
ly/3amZjiq.
3. Mona Yacoubian, “Syria Timeline: Since the Uprising Against
Assad”, United States Institute of Peace, January 1, 2021, accessed June 16, 2022, https://bit.ly/3atsAZ2.
4. MacDonald 2004.
5. Baur et al. 2021; MacDonald 2004.
6. For example, shrapnel, soup cans, bottle tops, etc. (MacDonald 2004). See also, Beran 2013 and Bauer et al. 2021.
7. This is particularly the case in challenging terrain.
8. Baur et al. 2021. The challenge in distinguishing actual hazardous ordnance from harmless metallic clutter means that
operators then must balance between two competing objectives: tuning detectors so precisely that they result in very
high levels of false positives, or not fine-tuned enough and
missing real UXOs (Beran 2013).; MacDonald 2004. Traditional
metal detectors also cannot capture an object’s size, shape, or
material properties, though innovation is ongoing in the field
to overcome this limitation. For example, Wilson and Ledger
(2021) explore the use of magnetic polarizability tensor (MPT).
The balancing results in a “receiving operating characteristics”
(ROC) curve, which estimates the probability of false alarms
(MacDonald 2004). Previous estimates have shown that the
rate of false alarms to true UXO detection is 99 to 1. Alternate
methods include sifting layer by layer of an entire area, which
has several weaknesses such as the high cost, endangerment
to wildlife, and environmental destruction.
9. Baur et al. 2021; Nikulin et al. spring/summer 2020.
10. Remote sensing using UAVs allows for quick and efficient
low-altitude scans of expansive areas.
11. Kolster et al. 2022.
12. Myers and Lathrop 2021.
13. Myers and Lathrop 2021; Kolster et al. 2022. Multi-sensor systems have traditionally been land-based, and they are very
costly to manufacture and burdensome to transport to remote
locations.
14. Baur et al. 2021.For instance, multi-sensor configurations use
ML to assess weather and terrain conditions to inform which
on-board geophysical instrument(s) would produce the most
precise landmine detection (Myers and Lanthrop 2021).
15. Nikulin et al. spring/summer 2020. Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss1/13/
16. See for instance: Baur et al. 2021; Henkel et al. 2020; Myers
and Lanthrop 2021.
17. Robinson and Baade 2021.
18. Robinson and Baade 2021.
19. The challenge of humanitarian efforts in conflict zones exemplifies this. For instance, in 2020, 475 aid workers were
attacked, with 108 of them killed, across 41 countries. The majority were working on the frontlines https://bit.ly/3OW0hRN.
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areas for future clearance efforts, noting there is a shortage in
funding to conduct such surveys (Halo Trust 2020). Available at:
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